IEEE S&P SYMPOSIUM GUEST EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION
F or 35 years, the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy has provided a venue for leading researchers in security and privacy to gather. It continues to be the premier forum for presenting developments in computer security and electronic privacy and for bringing together researchers and practitioners. Th e topics covered at the symposium have varied over the years, yet the work presented has always been considered some of the best timely research in the fi eld.
In an eff ort to bring some of the symposium to a wider audience, IEEE Security & Privacy magazine's editorial board decided to devote one special issue each year to a reprise of selected papers from the symposium.
A Fertile Field
We selected several symposium papers and invited authors to submit revised articles targeted to the broader magazine audience and enhanced with new results since the original paper's publication. We consulted with the symposium's program chairs and chose papers based on general interest and accessibility.
Several papers were from the symposium's Systemization of Knowledge (SoK) sessions, which encourage work that evaluates, systematizes, and contextualizes existing knowledge. SoK papers provide a high value to the community but might not be accepted for publication in the symposium proceedings because of a potential lack of novel research contributions. Nonetheless, SoK papers analyze the current research landscape-identifying areas that have enjoyed much research att ention, pointing out areas with unsolved challenges, and presenting a prioritization that can guide researchers solving important challenges. Th is sort of contribution is particularly valuable for S&P's broad readership.
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An Enduring Symposium for Leading Research in Security and Privacy
Capitalizing on the strength of the community as embodied by the symposium as well as the magazine and the worldwide attention to cybersecurity, we selected six articles from the 2014 symposium. Not surprisingly, two articles address issues with anonymity. Three others provide a discussion of system security vulnerabilities and challenges in large-scale untrusted systems. The final article discusses the unique vulnerabilities in smart card payment systems.
In This Issue
In "Understanding Sensitivity by Analyzing Anonymity," Sai Teja Peddiniti and his colleagues demonstrate the use of data to help online services improve their products by developing features that allow their users to express and exercise privacy preferences. The interesting result of this study, which used a question-andanswer portal, is that users often have a much broader definition of what's sensitive than service providers or regulators. These results are directly relevant to the many social media sites that often have either very complex privacy settings or highly granular settings.
"An Overview of ANONIZE: A Large-Scale Anonymous Survey System," by Susan Hohenberger and her colleagues, also concerns protecting user privacy and anonymity. This article describes a secure ad hoc survey scheme in which only selected users can anonymously submit exactly one response. This work's contribution is not only in its scheme but also in the formal analysis that shows it can scale and securely implement millionperson anonymous surveys. The authors report that, to the best of their knowledge, this is the first implementation of a large-scale secure computation protocol that scales to millions of users and is practical enough for use today.
Moving from anonymity to systems security, Per Larsen and his colleagues' "Automatic Software Diversity" describes an approach to software diversity that reduces the attack surface and makes it more difficult for attackers to exploit vulnerabilities in low-level systems software. Implementing automatic software diversity without affecting performance or behavior is challenging. The authors examine the tradeoffs that designers of diversified defense mechanisms face.
"Dancing with Giants: Wimpy Kernels for OnDemand I/O Isolation," by Zongwei Zhou and his colleagues, also looks at issues in providing system security. The authors describe an approach to securely compose functionally rich "giant" commodities with stripped-down ("wimpy") security-sensitive applications. They present a security architecture based on a wimpy kernel that provides on-demand isolated I/O channels to sensitive applications. This approach to secure composition allows a large commodity operating system to work securely in conjunction with a small security-sensitive application, resulting in a significant reduction in size of the wimpy kernel's code base. This small subsystem can then outsource complexity to the giant OS and achieve a degree of simplicity that can be subjected to more stringent validation and assurance techniques.
In "Introspections on the Semantic Gap," Bhushan Jain and his colleagues describe design tradeoffs and considerations when building virtual machine introspection (VMI). The goal of VMI is to provide security policy enforcement in the presence of an untrusted OS. However, a significant challenge to meeting this goal is bridging the gap between the hypervisor's hardware-level view and that of a guest OS. This is called the semantic gap and was first identified in early 2002. Tremendous progress has been made since then, but it's come at the cost of reintroducing trust into the guest OS. The authors look at the essential design considerations and explain how these choices dictate the overall system's trust model and security properties.
These three articles-"Automatic Software Diversity," "Dancing with Giants: Wimpy Kernels for OnDemand I/O Isolation," and "Introspections on the Semantic Gap"-all demonstrate the continuing tradeoffs between overall system security and functionality in the underlying systems that are pervasive today.
The final article in this special issue, "Be Prepared: The EMV Preplay Attack," by Mike Bond and his colleagues, tackles a very real threat that has emerged as society looks to find a secure smart card-based payment system. EMV, also known as "chip and PIN," is the leading system for smart card-based payments worldwide. The system includes a cryptographic protocol between the chip card and the bank servers. The authors discovered two protocol flaws that together make EMV vulnerable to a "preplay attack," in which prerecorded transaction data from a target card can be replayed later. The authors describe how this attack can be exploited.
I
hope that by bringing a piece of the symposium to you, S&P will enhance the value of both the symposium and the magazine to the community. I look forward to seeing you at the symposium if you're able to attend and connecting with you through the pages of this magazine throughout the year. 
